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IS BIOPHARMA READY FOR THE STANDARDS WARS?
Jorge L. Contreras †
0F

ABSTRACT
This symposium contribution sheds new light on Momenta v.
Amphastar, a case in which issues relating to standardization and
patent disclosure that have previously been observed in the
semiconductor, computing, and telecommunications sectors found
their way into a dispute between two biosimilar manufacturers. One
such manufacturer, Momenta, participated in the development of a
standard for testing the purity of generic enoxaparin under the
auspices of the United States Pharmacopeial Convention but failed to
disclose that it had applied for a patent on the testing method. When
Momenta later sued Amphastar for patent infringement by using the
method in accordance with the FDA’s approval of its own generic
version of enoxaparin, Amphastar raised waiver and equitable
estoppel as defenses, then brought antitrust claims against Momenta
and its distribution partner Sandoz. Amphastar prevailed at the
district court, obtaining a ruling that Momenta’s patent was
unenforceable. This case demonstrates that issues surrounding the
acquisition and disclosure of patents on standardized technologies
have more salience in the biopharma sector than commonly believed.
As such, standards organizations operating in this sector should
ensure that their policies and procedures are robust enough to
delineate clearly the obligations of participants with respect to patents
covering standardized technologies, and organizations that
participate in biopharma standards-development should heed the

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I1.2
†

Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College
of Law, Adjunct Professor, Department of Human Genetics, University of Utah
School of Medicine. This research was made possible in part through generous
support from the Huntsman Cancer Institute. This paper has benefitted from
discussion and feedback at the Texas A&M School of Law Symposium on
Pharmaceutical Innovation, Patent Protection and Regulatory Exclusivities (Oct.
2019). Comments and feedback by Jacob Sherkow and research assistance by
Sydney Hecimovich are greatly appreciated.

43

44

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 7

valuable lessons offered by more than three decades of litigation and
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of a
generic biosimilar version of the best-selling anticoagulant
enoxaparin, sued another generic enoxaparin manufacturer,
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, for patent infringement. The asserted
patent (U.S. Patent No. 7,575,886 (the “‘886 Patent”)) did not claim a
chemical structure or attribute of the drug but a quality control process
used in its manufacture. The process, known as “Method 207”, was
developed at the United States Pharmacopeial Convention (“USP”),
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the body responsible for setting many drug-related standards in the
United States. According to Amphastar, USP’s internal policies
required participants in the development of USP standards to disclose
patents and patent applications covering proposed USP standards.
Though at least one Momenta researcher was involved in the
development of Method 207, Momenta failed to disclose the ‘886
Patent prior to USP’s approval of Method 207. Amphastar then used
Method 207 in the production of generic enoxaparin, allegedly
pursuant to U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
requirements. 1 When Momenta sued Amphastar for infringement of
the ‘886 Patent, Amphastar argued that by failing to comply with
USP’s patent disclosure requirements, Momenta waived its right to
enforce the patent, was estopped from doing so, and that any such
enforcement constituted attempted monopolization in violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Contentions such as these have been made for decades in the
computing, networking, telecommunications, and semiconductor
industries (generally lumped together as “information and
communications technology” or “ICT”), which depend heavily on
industry standards. 2 Litigation over the disclosure and non-disclosure
of patents essential to industry standards (standards-essential patents
or “SEP”s) has included both private claims and enforcement actions
by governmental agencies in the U.S. and abroad. The aggregate of
these disputes has colloquially been termed the global “standards
wars.” 3 But while a range of industry standards have been developed
for biotechnology and pharmaceutical applications, 4 few of them have
resulted in disputes relating to patents. Momenta v. Amphastar is
1F

2F

3F

4F

1. Complaint at 12, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc. (C.D. Cal.
2017) (No. 5:15-cv-01914) [hereinafter Complaint I].
2. There are a few notable exceptions, including the FTC’s case against Unocal
with respect to a standard for gasoline additives. See discussion infra Part III.A.
3. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, The Global Standards Wars: Patent and
Competition Disputes in North America, Europe and Asia, KEIO U. J.L. POLS. &
SOC.
(2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106090
[https://perma.cc/ZB42-TNZV].
4. See, e.g., JORGE L. CONTRERAS & ADRIAN THOROGOOD, Technical
Standards for Bioinformatics and Medical Informatics, in BIOINFORMATICS,
MEDICAL INFORMATICS AND THE LAW (Jorge L. Contreras, A. James Cuticchia, &
Gregory
Kirsch,
eds.,
Edward
Elgar),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3665429
[https://perma.cc/7L6U-UP5V] (forthcoming 2021) (describing a range of standards
in the fields of genetics, genomics and computational biology).
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notable, if not unique, in that it brings to the biopharmaceutical sector
a type of dispute most frequently encountered in the litigious ICT
sector. The Momenta I case is also distinctive among biopharma patent
disputes in that it involved not a branded pharmaceutical manufacturer
suing a generic manufacturer for patent infringement (a relatively
common occurrence) or a generic manufacturer challenging the
validity of a patent on a branded pharmaceutical product, but a patent
dispute between two generic biosimilar producers.
Part I of this Essay provides an overview of the recent law and
policy that has evolved around the disclosure and non-disclosure of
patents within the context of industry standard-setting, primarily in the
ICT sector. Part II describes the background and facts of Momenta I
then discusses the district court’s holding regarding Momenta’s
alleged failure to disclose the ‘886 patent. This Essay concludes with
some observations regarding the implications of Momenta I and the
growing importance of collaboratively developed industry standards
for the biopharmaceutical sector more broadly.
II. STANDARDS AND PATENTS
A. Policies of Standards Development Organizations
Market participants collaborating within trade associations
known as standards-development organizations (“SDO”s) have
developed most of the technical interoperability standards in use
today. SDOs range from governmentally recognized bodies that
address a diverse range of standardization projects (e.g., the
International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”)), to large,
well-established private sector groups that address the standardization
needs of major industry segments (e.g., the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”), Internet
Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), and Institute for Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”)) to smaller groups often referred to as
“consortia” that focus on one or a handful of related standards (e.g.,
the HDMI Forum, Bluetooth Special Interest Group, and USB Forum).
Because of the significant market benefits that arise from the broad
adoption of technical standards, 5 a high degree of cooperation among
5F

5. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
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competitors has long been tolerated by antitrust and competition law
authorities, which might otherwise discourage such large-scale
coordination by competitors.
Many of the technological features included in standards can
be patented. Such patents are typically obtained by SDO participants
that make technical contributions to the standard. However, to the
extent that patents cover technologies that are “essential” to the
implementation of a standard, concerns can arise. Specifically, there
is a risk that the holder of a SEP could emerge after the broad
deployment of a standard and then demand excessive rent from all
implementers of the standard. Because those implementers may have
invested significant amounts of money in the design and production of
standardized products, they may incur high, if not prohibitive, costs if
they are forced to switch to a new, non-infringing (and nonstandardized) technology. As a result, they may be willing to pay the
rent that an SEP holder demands in order to avoid even higher
switching costs. This phenomenon has been termed patent or standards
“hold-up” and is discussed extensively in the literature. 6 In addition to
harming potential competitors, patent hold-up can have other
undesirable market effects, including raising prices for consumers and
hindering technological innovation. 7
To ensure broad access to the standards that they develop and
to avoid patent hold-up, many SDOs have adopted policies that fall
into two general categories: disclosure policies and licensing policies. 8
6F

7F

8F

COMPETITION
33–37
(2007),
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UX5-Q4CS]
[hereinafter DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR].
6. See Norman V. Siebrasse, Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking: A Review
of the Literature, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A
GLOBAL CONSENSUS (C. Bradford Biddle et al. eds., 2019); Jorge L. Contreras,
Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property: A
Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, VOL. II –
ANALYTICAL METHODS 185, 199–200 (Peter S. Menell & David Schwartz eds.,
2019); DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR, supra note 5, at 35–40.
7. DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR, supra note 5, at 35–40; RENATA B. HESSE &
FRANCES MARSHALL, U.S. Antitrust Aspects of FRAND Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST
AND PATENTS 263, 265 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
8. See DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR, supra note 5, at 42. These policies are
generally considered to be binding on participants in the SDO’s activities, though
the legal effect of such policies is not always clear. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market
Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH
AND
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Disclosure policies require SDO participants to disclose SEPs that
they hold to the SDO, generally prior to the approval of a standard.
Early disclosure of SEPs enables standards developers to decide
whether or not to approve a design that is covered by these SEPs, to
choose an alternative, non-infringing technology, to modify a draft
standard to eliminate the infringing feature, or to seek licenses to the
patented technology. 9
Licensing policies, on the other hand, require SEP holders to
grant standardized product manufacturers the right to use their SEPs
on terms that are either royalty-free (“RF”) or that bear royalties that
are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (“FRAND”). These
commitments are intended to assure product manufacturers that they
will be able to obtain all licenses necessary to manufacture a
standardized product. FRAND or RF licensing commitments are
required by all SDOs accredited by the American National Standards
Institute (“ANSI”) and are also widely utilized among other SDOs
around the world. 10
9F

10F

B. Standards Deception as a Defense to Infringement of SEPs
When a SEP holder violates an SDO’s patent disclosure
requirements and subsequently seeks to enforce patents against
implementers of a standard, the infringing implementer may raise one
or more equitable defenses. These defenses include fraud, estoppel,
laches, waiver, unclean hands, and implied license. 11 Each of these
defenses is based on the failure of the SEP holder to disclose an SEP
necessary for implementation of the collaboratively developed
standard. For example, in Stambler v. Diebold, the patent holder
(Diebold) allegedly knew for ten years that a proposed standard
concerning the activation of automated teller machines infringed its
1F

L. REV 479, 501–17 (2015).
9. See Gil Ohana & C. Bradford Biddle, The Disclosure of Patents and
Licensing Terms in Standards Development, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 244,
245 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018); DOJ-FTC Antitrust & IPR, supra note 5, at 42–
45.
10. JUSTUS BARON, ET AL., MAKING THE RULES: THE GOVERNANCE OF
STANDARD DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR POLICIES ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 135 (Nikolaus Thumm ed., 2019) [hereinafter JRC Report].
11. See generally, Daryl Lim, Unilateral Conduct and Standards, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST
AND PATENTS 47, 56–60 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).

2021]

IS BIOPHARMA READY FOR THE STANDARD

49

patent, yet remained silent “while an entire industry adopted the
proposed standard.” 12 The court concluded that Diebold’s silence was
“intentionally misleading” and granted summary judgment for the
defendant based on the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel.
In Wang v. Mitsubishi, 13 Wang Laboratories proposed a
memory chip standard to an SDO known as the Joint Electron Device
Engineering Council (“JEDEC”). 14 During the three years that the
JEDEC deliberated the standard, Wang did not disclose that it was
seeking patent protection for the chip design. After the JEDEC
approved the standard and manufacturers like Mitsubishi began to
manufacture chips conforming to the standard, Wang began to enforce
its patent. Mitsubishi argued that Wang’s conduct over a six-year
period gave rise to an implied license under the patent. The jury agreed
with Mitsubishi, and both the district court and the Federal Circuit
affirmed, pointing to the large amount of evidence that Wang’s
conduct created an implied license.
In Qualcomm I, 15 the Federal Circuit held that Qualcomm’s
intentional failure to disclose essential patents covering the H.264
video compression standard to the Joint Video Team (JVT) SDO
supported the district court’s finding that Qualcomm ceded its right to
enforce those patents under the doctrine of implied waiver. 16 The
district court applied the remedy of unenforceability to the patents that
Qualcomm failed to disclose. It analogized Qualcomm’s inaction to
inequitable conduct before the PTO and patent misuse—other forms
of conduct resulting in the unenforceability of patent rights. 17 The
Federal Circuit approved the district court’s reasoning, recognizing its
authority to “give a fair, just, and equitable response reflective of the
offending conduct.” 18
In each of these cases, the remedy for the SEP holder’s failure
to disclose patents in violation of an SDO’s written or unwritten
12F

13F

14F

15F

16F

17F

18F

12. Stambler v. Diebold, Inc., No. 85 CV 3014, 1988 WL 95479 at 6 (E.D.N.Y.
1988).
13. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1582 (9th
Cir. 1997).
14. JEDEC also makes an appearance in the Rambus disputes, discussed below.
15. Qualcomm Corp. v. Broadcom, Inc., 548 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008).
16. Id. at 1022, 1024 (the Federal Circuit also spoke favorably about the doctrine
of estoppel, though because of the court’s finding regarding waiver, did not need to
reach the issue).
17. Id. at 1025–26.
18. Id. at 1026.
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policies was to render the undisclosed SEPs unenforceable against
products implementing the relevant standards. This remedy is
sweeping, as it is generally interpreted to cover not only the particular
product manufacturer that raised the defense, but also all implementers
of the relevant standard. 19
19F

C. Antitrust Remedies for Standards Deception
In addition to the common law defenses that an infringing
implementer can raise, standards deception by a SEP holder can give
rise to antitrust claims under the Sherman Act. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States.” 20 To prevail on a claim for monopolization or attempted
monopolization, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had power
in the relevant market and willfully sought, acquired, or maintained
that power in an unlawful manner. Monopolization claims also require
that the defendant had “market power” or the ability to distort
competition in a particular product or technology market. Some have
argued that standards, once adopted broadly in the marketplace, can
confer market power on the holders of patents that is essential to the
use of those standards. 21 The abuse of such market power could thus
constitute unlawful monopolization or attempted monopolization.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has taken the view
that an SEP holder’s failure to disclose patents essential to industry
standards can thus constitute a violation of Section 2. As explained by
the FTC, “Exclusionary conduct such as deception may distort the
selection of technologies and evade protections designed by [SDOs]
to constrain the exercise of monopoly power, with substantial and
lasting harm to competition.” 22
20F

21F

2F

19. See Jorge L. Contreras, Equity, Antitrust, and the Reemergence of the Patent
Unenforceability Remedy, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Nov. 1, 2011, at 1 (discussing
remedy of patent unenforceability and other equitable remedies).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
21. Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and
Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market
Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 3–4 (2005); AM. BAR ASSN., HANDBOOK ON
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING 115–17 (2011); Herbert Hovenkamp,
FRAND and Antitrust, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 19–20 (Aug.
2019), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2093/ [perma.cc
/9FYQ-Z5SK].
22. Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117, at *18 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006),
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The FTC has brought claims based on deceptive conduct
within an SDO principally under its authority to enforce Section 5 of
the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition. 23 These
cases have included actions against Dell Computer24 and Unocal, 25
both of which involved allegations that an SDO participant
deceptively withheld information about patents essential to the
practice of a standard and later sought to assert those patents. In each
case, this deception was claimed to constitute exclusionary conduct
giving rise to a claim for monopolization. The FTC settled its cases
against Dell and Unocal, in each case entering a consent order
effectively rendering the asserted patents unenforceable. 26
Perhaps the best-known case of alleged deception within a
standards body involved semiconductor memory designer Rambus,
Inc. The FTC investigated Rambus for a pattern of allegedly deceptive
conduct within JEDEC, including the amendment of its thenundisclosed patent applications to cover current discussions within the
SDO. The FTC found that Rambus had engaged in deceptive practices
amounting to unfair methods of competition that violated Section 5 of
the FTC Act as well as Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 27
This theory also received support from the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Qualcomm II, 28 a private antitrust action
brought by Broadcom in response to Qualcomm’s assertion of
previously undisclosed SEPs against it. 29 Broadcom argued that
Qualcomm’s intentionally false representations to an SDO known as
the Joint Video Group (JVG) violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
and the court agreed. The court noted that such deception “harms the
23F

24F

25F

26F

27F

28F

29F

rev’d 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
24. Dell Comput. Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 616 (1996).
25. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 2005 WL 6241013 (F.T.C. Jul. 27, 2005).
26. See Lim, supra note 12 at 54–56; Hesse & Marshall, supra note 8, at 271–
72.
27. Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330117, at *18. The FTC’s judgment against
Rambus was reversed by the DC Circuit due to the FTC’s failure to prove an antitrust
injury (harm to competition) (Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
See, generally, Lim, supra note 11, at 51–54; Hesse & Marshall, supra note 7, at
272–73.
28. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2007);
see also Hesse & Marshall, supra note 8, at 274–75.
29. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2007)
(note that this action was brought roughly in parallel with the action that resulted in
the Federal Circuit’s 2008 ruling in Qualcomm I, discussed above).
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competitive process by obscuring the costs of including proprietary
technology in a standard and increasing the likelihood that patent
rights will confer monopoly power on the patent holder.” 30 Despite the
specter of such liability, however, the court found that Broadcom
lacked standing to bring a claim for monopolization (as it did not yet
compete in the relevant market), and that it failed to allege a
cognizable antitrust injury. 31 Thus, the court did not ultimately apply
the Sherman Act to Qualcomm’s alleged misconduct.
30F

31F

III. THE ENOXAPARIN CONTROVERSY: A BIOPHARMA STANDARDS
DISPUTE
A. Enoxaparin—Approval and Market Entry
The anticoagulant properties of the heparin molecule were first
described in 1916. 32 Heparin soon became a common ingredient in
treatments for thrombosis, myocardial infarction, and other clotting
disorders. In the 1970s, researchers began to experiment with shorter
chemical chains derived from the heparin molecule—low molecular
weight heparins—which appeared to offer similar efficacy with fewer
side effects. 33 Enoxaparin was the first such low molecular weight
heparin to be approved for use in humans. Sanofi-Aventis filed a U.S.
patent application covering enoxaparin in 1991, resulting in the
issuance of U.S. Pat. No. 5,389,618 in 1995. 34 Shortly thereafter,
Sanofi-Aventis introduced enoxaparin to the U.S. market under the
brand name Lovenox. 35 Lovenox became a blockbuster drug,
achieving $2.7 billion in sales during 2009 alone. 36
In March 2003, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, a specialty
pharmaceutical manufacturer based in Rancho Cucamonga,
California, filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”)
with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), seeking
32F

3F

34F

35F

36F

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jie Jack Li & E.J. Corey, Drug Discovery: Practices, Processes, and
Perspectives 189 (2013).
33. Id.
34. U.S. Patent NO. 5,389,618 (filed Jul. 16, 1993) (issued Feb. 14, 1995).
35. Complaint I, supra note 1, at 4.
36. Dana A. Elfin, Momenta Battle Over Amphastar Generic Continues,
BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2017, 5:37 pm), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharmaand-life-sciences/momenta-battle-over-amphastar-generic-continues
[perma.cc/L4Z8-9AE9].
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clearance to market a generic or biosimilar version of enoxaparin. 37
Amphastar’s ANDA contained a declaration challenging SanofiAventis’s ‘618 patent. 38 As a result, in August 2003, Sanofi-Aventis
sued Amphastar for infringement of the ‘618 patent. 39 That litigation
continued for five years and was appealed twice to the Federal Circuit.
In May 2008, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
that the ‘618 patent was unenforceable (for reasons unrelated to USP
and its standards). 40 The invalidation of Sanofi-Aventis’s ‘618 patent
cleared the way for entry of generic competitors into the market for
enoxaparin subject to FDA approval.
In 2003, the Sandoz division of Novartis entered into a
collaboration agreement with Momenta Pharmaceuticals of
Cambridge, Massachusetts, relating to the development, manufacture,
and commercialization of a generic version of enoxaparin. 41 Based on
characterization work conducted by Momenta, Sandoz filed its own
ANDA relating to enoxaparin in August 2005. 42
Enoxaparin, a broken-down form of the polymer heparin, is a
complex biologic pharmaceutical that is manufactured using an
organic process rather than traditional chemistry. As a result, it is
difficult to determine definitively whether a particular, generic version
of enoxaparin is truly “bioequivalent” to the FDA-approved Lovenox.
During the pendency of the ANDAs for generic enoxaparin, SanofiAventis contended that enoxaparin could be manufactured only using
Sanofi-Aventis’s proprietary manufacturing process, and that without
it, a generic manufacturer could not guarantee that any substance it
37F

38F

39F

40F

41F

42F

37. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, APPLICATION NUMBER:
ANDA 076684, CHEMISTRY REVIEWS, 3 (July 25, 2011).
38. Id. at 4. The ANDA process includes what is known as a “Paragraph IV”
certification. This regulatory pathway allows a generic drug maker to declare that
the patent(s) protecting a brand-name drug are invalid or otherwise unenforceable.
The certification immediately forces the issue to litigation in federal court, without
requiring the generic manufacturer to enter the market and risk being held liable for
patent infringement. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2019).
39. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2008). Sanofi-Aventis also sued Teva Pharmaceuticals of Israel, which had also
submitted an NDA for the marketing of generic enoxaparin. Aventis Pharma S.A. v.
Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 936 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
40. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1349.
41. Complaint I, supra note 1, at 6–7.
42. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR:
APPLICATION NUMBER: ANDA 77-857, 4 (July 23, 2010).
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produced was biologically equivalent to enoxaparin. 43 Researchers at
Momenta, however, identified a unique chemical signature for
enoxaparin. On this basis, Momenta contended that one could reliably
determine whether a manufactured compound was enoxaparin. As
such, Momenta and Sandoz claimed to overcome Sanofi-Aventis’s
objection that manufacturing enoxaparin would not be possible
without using Sanofi-Aventis’s proprietary manufacturing process. In
2003, Momenta filed a patent application, claiming several methods
of characterizing enoxaparin. The patent was issued in 2009, listing
five inventors including Dr. Zachary Shriver, a senior director of
research analytics at Momenta.
In July 2010, the FDA approved the Sandoz-Momenta ANDA
for generic enoxaparin. 44 Sandoz began sales of enoxaparin in the U.S.
shortly thereafter.
43F

4F

B. The USP and Method 207
The USP is a non-profit organization founded in 1820. USP
produces a substance and preparation monograph for each FDAapproved drug, including biologics such as enoxaparin. 45 The FDA
relies heavily on USP monographs in approving drugs for marketing,
and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides that approved
drugs must meet the strength, quality, and purity requirements set forth
by the USP. 46
In 2006, at the urging of Sanofi-Aventis, USP began to develop
a standard for testing the purity of enoxaparin during the
manufacturing process. 47 The standard was based on the presence of a
particular “1,6 anhydro ring” (“AR”) structure in 15-25% of
enoxaparin carbohydrate chains. 48 Sanofi-Aventis proposed to USP a
45F

46F

47F

48F

43. See Transcript of Record: Dr. Kaundinya at 13039, 13041, Momenta Pharm.,
Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., No. 18-1740 (Fed. Cir. appeal docketed March 29,
2018); Larry Bell & Peter O. Safir, Citizens Petition 1–26, 24 (Feb. 19, 2003).
44. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FDA, APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR:
APPLICATION NUMBER: ANDA 77-857, 4 (July 23, 2010).
45. See U.S. Pharmacopial Convention, Legal Recognition – Standards
Categories, https://www.usp.org/about/legal-recognition/standard-categories#
biologics (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GP5P-3BY7].
46. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(b), 321(j).
47. Presumably, Sanofi-Aventis wished to ensure that any generic version of
enoxaparin on the market was in fact equivalent to Lovenox.
48. Brief for Appellants at 21, Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc.,
686 F.3d 1348 (2012), 2011 WL 7111556.
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method (which Sanofi-Aventis had allegedly sought to patent) for
determining whether the AR structure was present using high
performance liquid chromatography (“HPLC”). 49 Sanofi-Aventis
urged USP to adopt its method as an official standard for the
manufacture of enoxaparin. This eventually became known as Method
207. 50
Momenta participated in the deliberations at USP and opposed
making Method 207 mandatory for determining the presence of the
AR structure. According to Momenta, it developed a superior method
for testing for the AR structure using nuclear magnetic resonance. 51
During a meeting in 2008, USP announced that Sanofi-Aventis
allowed its patent application covering its method of detecting the AR
structure to lapse. 52 As there were no other known patents or patent
applications covering the proposed method, USP approved Method
207 in 2009. 53 Yet while the USP monograph for enoxaparin, which
became effective in December 2009, contained a requirement that at
least 20% of manufactured enoxaparin contain the AR structure, the
monograph did not require that a particular method be used to make
that determination.
During its evaluation of Amphastar’s ANDA for generic
enoxaparin, the FDA issued a Quality Deficiency letter in September
2009, requesting that Amphastar confirm that its manufactured
enoxaparin would comply with the requirements of the USP
monograph, including presence of the AR structure.54 In its response,
Amphastar committed that it would ensure that its manufactured
enoxaparin complied with the USP monograph requirements,
including the presence of the AR structure in the required amounts. 55
However, neither the FDA nor Amphastar discussed the specific
method that would be used to detect the AR structure in Amphastar’s
49F

50F

51F

52F

53F

54F

5F

49. Id. at 22.
50. USP, <207> Test for 1,6-anhydro Derivative for Enoxaparin Sodium.
51. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 18, Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar
Pharm., Inc., Fed. Cir. Case No. 18-1740 (filed July 30, 2018) [hereinafter Momenta
Appeal Brief].
52. Complaint I, supra note 1, at 12.
53. Id.
54. FDA Off. Generic Drugs, Deficiency Letter for ANDA 76-684, Dated Sept.
4, 2009 (Deficiency A2).
55. Amphastar, Quality Amendment for ANDA 76-684 – Enoxaparin Sodium
Injection, Sept. 18, 2009 (response to Deficiency A2).
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manufactured enoxaparin. The FDA approved Amphastar’s ANDA in
September 2011, and Amphastar began sales in the U.S. 56
Two days later, Momenta brought suit against Amphastar for
infringement of the ‘886 patent in the Federal District Court for the
District of Massachusetts. 57 Specifically, Momenta alleged that
Amphastar’s method for testing manufactured enoxaparin for the AR
structure infringed the claims of the patent, which covered numerous
testing methods. 58 After a lengthy set of proceedings, including two
separate appeals to the Federal Circuit, 59 a jury found in 2017 that
Amphastar infringed the claims of the ‘886 patent, but that the claims
were invalid due to lack of enablement and inadequate written
description. 60 The District Court affirmed the jury’s verdict.
In addition, Amphastar raised the equitable defenses of waiver
and estoppel, as to which the jury rendered an advisory verdict in favor
of Amphastar. 61 The District Court adopted the jury’s advisory
56F

57F

58F

59F

60F

61F

56. Drugs@FDA: FDA-Approved Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.proces
s&ApplNo=076684 [https://perma.cc/VE7E-5S25] (last visited Feb. 25, 2020).
57. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 184, 188
(D. Mass. 2011).
58. There are numerous methods that can be used to test enoxaparin for the
presence of the AR structure. As noted above, Sanofi-Aventis developed a method
based on HPLC which eventually was adopted as USP’s Method 207. Momenta
Appeal Brief, supra note 52, at 17–18. Momenta first used capillary electrophoresis,
and then switched to a superior method based on nuclear magnetic resonance.
Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 52, at 6. And Amphastar developed a
disaccharide building block (DBB) procedure for testing enoxaparin, which the FDA
approved in 2006 and 2007. Stephen A. Campbell, Telephone Amendment: RE:
ANDA 76-684, Enoxaparin Sodium Injection, Amphastar Pharm., (Nov. 2, 2006);
Stephen A. Campbell, Telephone Amendment: RE: ANDA 76-684, Enoxaparin
Sodium Injection, Amphastar Pharm., (March 29, 2007). At some point after it began
to produce generic enoxaparin in September 2011, Amphastar switched from the
DBB procedure to Method 207 for testing its product. Momenta alleges that
Amphastar strategically switched from the DBB procedure to Method 207 in order
to argue that because it was using a method required by the FDA (a requirement that
Momenta disputes), it was immunized from suit under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (“It
shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United
States … a patented invention … solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs…”).
59. See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 457 F. App’x. 929
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
60. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 258, 262
(D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2018).
61. J.E. Macy, Annotation, Nature and Effect of Jury’s. Verdict in Equity, 15
A.L.R. 1147 (originally pub. 1945).
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verdict. 62 The basis for Amphastar’s waiver and estoppel was
Momenta’s failure to disclose the ‘886 patent, allegedly in violation
of USP’s rules and policies. In 2015, Amphastar brought an antitrust
action against Momenta and Sandoz, also in the District of
Massachusetts, alleging that they violated the Sherman Act and state
antitrust laws as a result of the same failure.63
62F

63F

C. The USP Policies
USP has a number of written policies that are binding on
individuals and firms participating in its standardization work. First,
the USP Rules and Procedures govern the conduct of USP’s various
expert bodies. 64 Second, the written USP Guidelines govern the
submission of proposals for the creation of a new USP monograph. 65
Amphastar argued that USP’s written policies required Dr.
Shriver to disclose the existence of Momenta’s application for the ‘886
patent to USP prior to approval of the standard, which he did not. Due
to this failure, Amphastar alleged that Momenta intentionally violated
USP’s policies. 66 In consequence, Amphastar argued that: (1)
Momenta waived its right to enforce the ‘886 patent, (2) Momenta was
estopped from enforcing the ‘886 patent, and (3) Momenta and Sandoz
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act as well as various state antitrust
and competition statutes by “wrongfully acquiring monopoly power
by deceiving the USP into adopting a standard which they later
claimed was covered by” the ‘886 patent. These allegations reflected
a typical SDO deception scenario, akin to the facts alleged in cases
like Dell, Rambus, and Qualcomm. In each of these cases, the central
issue is “the consequence of silence in the face of a duty to disclose
patents in a standards-setting organization.” 67
64F

65F

6F

67F

62. Momenta I, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 265.
63. See generally Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 297 F. Supp.
3d 222 (D. Mass. 2018).
64. USP Rules and Procedures of the 2005-2010 Council of Experts, U.S.
PHARMACOPEIA,
http://www.pharmacopeia.cn/v29240/usp29nf24s0_rules-12158.html [https://perma.cc/V3PN-ZL8E] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
65. USP Guideline for Submitting Requests for Revision to USP-NF (April 29,
2016), https://www.usp.org/sites/default/files/usp/document/get-involved/
submission-guidelines/general-information-for-all-submissions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KJZ-2UYV].
66. Complaint I, supra note 1, at 10–11.
67. Qualcomm Corp. v. Broadcom Inc., 548 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008).
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In assessing Momenta’s failure to disclose the ‘886 patent, the
court considered Momenta’s and Dr. Shriver’s obligations under
USP’s written policies. First, under the USP Guidelines, all
“Sponsors” of USP technical proposals are requested to disclose
“whether any portion of the methods or procedures submitted are
subject to patent or other Sponsor-held intellectual property rights.”68
Momenta made no disclosure responsive to this provision. 69 However,
the court noted that the only official “Sponsor” of Method 207 was
Sanofi-Aventis. Because Momenta was not listed as a Sponsor of the
standard, it had no obligation to disclose its patent under this
provision.
Next, Section 2.05 of the USP Rules and Procedures states that
no advisory panel member with a “financial or other interest that may
conflict, or may appear to conflict, with his or her duties and
responsibilities with respect to a particular matter, shall vote on such
matter.” 70 Dr. Shriver was a member of USP’s Heparin Ad Hoc
Advisory Panel and, as such, was subject to the Rules and Procedures.
Accordingly, Dr. Shriver abstained from voting on the Method 207
standard. 71 The court agreed that Dr. Shriver’s abstention from the
Method 207 vote complied with Section 2.05 of the Rules and
Procedures.
Finally, Section 2.06(a) of the Rules and Procedures requires
that each advisory panel member submits a written statement to USP
disclosing his or her employer, sources of research funding, and “other
professional or financial interests, including intellectual property
rights, that may result in a conflict of interest or the appearance of a
conflict of interest.” 72 Dr. Shriver submitted such a statement and
68F

69F

70F

71F

72F

68. USP Guideline for Submitting Requests for Revision to USP-NF (April 29,
2016), https://www.usp.org/sites/default/files/usp/document/get-involved/submissi
n-guidelines/general-information-for-all-submissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KJZ2UYV].
69. Momenta I, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 265.
70. USP Rules and Procedures of the 2005-2010 Council of Experts, U.S.
PHARMACOPEIA, http://www.pharmacopeia.cn/v29240/usp29nf24s0_rules-12-158
.html [https://perma.cc/V3PN-ZL8E] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). The topic of
conflicts of interest and their disclosure within scientific and technical bodies has
gained significant attention in recent years. See, generally Jorge L. Contreras &
Marc D. Rinehart, Conflicts of Interest and Academic Research in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Ch. 7,
143–65 (Jacob Rooksby, ed., Edward Elgar, 2020).
71. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 266.
72. USP Rules and Procedures of the 2005-2010 Council of Experts, U.S.
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accurately identified Momenta as his employer. 73 The only area in
which Dr. Shriver’s disclosure may have been wanting was his lack of
response to a catch-all provision requiring disclosure of “other
professional or financial interests.” Conceivably, this provision could
have been interpreted to require Dr. Shriver to disclose the Momenta
patent on which he was listed as an inventor. However, the court found
that, at worst, the USP conflicts of interest policy was ambiguous
regarding any affirmative obligation to disclose patents. 74
73F

74F

D. Participant Understandings of USP’s Disclosure Requirement
In at least two well-known standards deception cases in the
ICT industry, courts have looked beyond the ambiguous language of
the relevant SDO policies to find affirmative obligations to disclose
SEPs. In Rambus v. Infineon, 75 semiconductor designer Rambus, Inc.
was accused, among other things, of committing fraud based on its
alleged concealment of patents that were essential to the
implementation of a standard developed at JEDEC. The district court
found that JEDEC’s written policies created no such duty of
disclosure. But the court also found, based on the testimony of various
JEDEC participants, that even without a written disclosure
requirement, SDO participants shared a common understanding that
they should disclose patents necessary to practice JEDEC standards.76
As such, the court recognized a legal duty to disclose arising from the
norms and practices of JEDEC participants. 77
The Federal Circuit in Qualcomm II also upheld a lower
court’s recognition of a duty to disclose based on informal
expectations and practices of SDO participants, where such a duty was
not clearly delineated in the SDO’s written policies. The court in
Qualcomm II recognized that “[a] duty to speak can arise from a group
75F

76F

7F

PHARMACOPEIA, http://www.pharmacopeia.cn/v29240/usp29nf24s0_rules-12-158
.html [https://perma.cc/V3PN-ZL8E] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
73. Zachary Shriver, USP Council of Experts, Expert Committee, and Ad Hoc
Advisory Panel Member Conflict of Interest Statement (Feb. 26, 2008) (reproduced
in Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 52, at 16).
74. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 266 (“This Court finds that the
disclosure obligation in the written USP policies is ambiguous”).
75. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
76. Id. at 1098.
77. Notwithstanding the existence of such a duty, Rambus was found not to have
violated its obligation to disclose patent applications to JEDEC. Id. at 1105.
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relationship in which the working policy of disclosure of related
intellectual property rights [(“IPR”)] is treated by the group as a whole
as imposing an obligation to disclose information in order to support
and advance the purposes of the group.” 78
Accordingly, the district court in Momenta II considered
whether USP participants “understood the policies to include a duty to
disclose” patents essential to USP standards, notwithstanding the
ambiguity of USP’s written policies. 79 In support of this proposition,
Amphastar introduced testimony from at least one former USP
employee, who testified that there was a “common understanding”
among USP participants that patent disclosures were required. 80 This
witness described a 2008 advisory panel meeting at which a USP
employee observed that Sanofi-Aventis, the Sponsor of Method 207,
had disclosed a relevant patent. According to the witness, a
representative from Momenta then asked USP to request SanofiAventis to abandon the patent before approving the standard, which it
ultimately did. 81 Amphastar argued that all of these facts indicated
both an informal expectation among USP participants to disclose
patents covering USP standards and that Momenta was aware of this
expectation. The court agreed, finding that notwithstanding the
absence of an express requirement to disclose patents essential to
USP’s standards, such an obligation should be implied on the basis of
unwritten participant expectations. 82
78F

79F

80F

81F

82F

E. Waiver
As noted in Part I, both courts and the FTC have found that a
patent holder’s deceptive failure to disclose an SEP in violation of an
SDO’s rules can result in a waiver of the right to enforce the SEP.
Given that Momenta had an implicit duty to disclose patents essential
to USP’s standards that its employees helped to develop, Amphastar
argued that Momenta breached that duty by failing to disclose the ‘886
patent or its application. As a result, Amphastar argued that Momenta

78. Qualcomm Corp. v. Broadcom Inc., 548 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing Broadcom Corp v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2007).
79. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 266.
80. Id. at 268.
81. Id. at 267.
82. See id. at 264.
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waived its right to enforce the ‘886 patent against Amphastar and other
implementers of Method 207. The district court agreed.
Citing Hynix v. Rambus, the court explained that “implied
waiver occurs if the behavior of the patent owner was so inconsistent
with an intent to enforce its rights as to induce a reasonable belief that
such right has been relinquished.” 83 Finding that Momenta had a duty
to disclose the ‘886 patent to USP and that it breached this duty, the
court held that Momenta waived its right to enforce the patent against
any implementers of Method 207. 84
83F

84F

F. Equitable Estoppel
Amphastar also argued that it reasonably and detrimentally
relied on Momenta’s misleading failure to disclose the ‘886 patent,
which induced Amphastar to make significant investments in
manufacturing enoxaparin using Method 207. As a result, Amphastar
argued Momenta should be estopped from enforcing the ‘886 patent
against it with respect to the use of Method 207. The district court
agreed. The court noted that to succeed on a claim for equitable
estoppel, the alleged infringer must prove that the patent owner
engaged in misleading conduct that resulted in a reasonable inference
that the owner did not intend to enforce its patent. 85 The infringer must
then show that it relied on the misleading conduct and that it will be
materially prejudiced if the patent holder is permitted to enforce the
patent against it. 86 The court acknowledged that a patent holder’s
breach of its obligation to disclose a patent to an SSO can constitute
misleading conduct in this context and that an infringer’s subsequent
adoption of the relevant standard can demonstrate reliance. 87
Applying these principles to the facts alleged in this case, the jury
found that Momenta breached its duty to USP through its silence and
85F

86F

87F

83. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. at 264 (citing Hynix Semiconductor
Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Qualcomm Corp.
v. Broadcom Inc., 548 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008)).
84. Id. at 265. The court limited the unenforceability of the ‘886 patent to
processes implementing USP Method 207 only. Because only two of the processes
used by Amphastar conformed to Method 207, and Amphastar’s DBB process did
not, the ‘886 patent was held to be unenforceable as to the two procedures that
conformed to the standard, but not to DBB. Id. at 270.
85. Id. at 269.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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that Amphastar detrimentally relied on Momenta’s silence in
practicing Method 207. 88 Accordingly, the district court held that
Momenta was estopped from enforcing the ‘886 patent against
Amphastar with respect to Method 207. 89
8F

89F

G. Antitrust Claims
In addition to raising defenses of waiver and estoppel in the
patent infringement suit brought by Momenta, Amphastar brought a
separate action in September 2015 charging Momenta and Sandoz
with violations of the Sherman Act and California antitrust and
competition law. 90 These claims were also based on Momenta’s
alleged failure to disclose the ‘886 patent in violation of USP’s
policies. 91 Amphastar argued that Momenta “wrongfully acquir[ed]
monopoly power by deceiving the USP into adopting” Method 207.
This conduct, Amphastar alleged, both improperly excluded
Amphastar from the market for generic enoxaparin and drove up the
price of generic enoxaparin by billions of dollars. 92
In denying Momenta’s motion to dismiss, the court again cited
Qualcomm II, particularly noting that “[d]eception in a consensusdriven private standard-setting environment harms the competitive
process by obscuring the costs of including proprietary technology in
a standard and increasing the likelihood that patent rights will confer
market power on the patent holder.” 93 Because Amphastar alleged
such conduct, the court held that it articulated a cognizable claim for
monopolization under the Sherman Act that survived Momenta’s
motion to dismiss. 94
In addition, one month after the initiation of Amphastar’s
antitrust suit, a group of plaintiffs led by Nashville General Hospital
brought an antitrust class action suit against Momenta and Sandoz in
90F

91F

92F

93F

94F

88. Id. at 269–70.
89. Id. at 270.
90. Amphastar filed this suit in the Central District of California in September
2015. Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 5:15-cv-01914 (C.D. Cal.
filed Sept. 17, 2015). The case was transferred to the District of Massachusetts in
January 2016. Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d
222, 227 (D. Mass. 2018).
91. Complaint I, supra note 1, at 10–13.
92. Id. at 19.
93. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 297 F. Supp. at 230.
94. See id.
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the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. 95 The
plaintiffs, consisting of hospitals, HMOs, and other healthcare payors,
alleged that Momenta’s and Sandoz’s actions delayed Amphastar’s
entry into the market for generic enoxaparin, resulting in elevated
prices for the drug. The plaintiffs alleged violations of both Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
95F

H. Appeal and Settlement
In April 2018, Momenta and Sandoz petitioned the district
court to certify an interlocutory appeal to the First Circuit for certain
antitrust questions raised in their motion to dismiss. 96 The District
Court denied the motion in June. 97 Momenta and Sandoz then
appealed the district court’s decisions on waiver and estoppel to the
Federal Circuit. 98 But in June 2019, prior to oral argument, the parties
settled their dispute. Under the terms of a confidential settlement
agreement, Momenta and Sandoz paid Amphastar $59.9 million and
dismissed all pending litigation among the parties. 99 Momenta and
Sandoz separately settled the Tennessee antitrust class action in
December 2019, with Momenta agreeing to pay $35 million and
96F

97F

98F

9F

95. See Complaint, Hosp. Auth. of Metro. Gov’t of Nashville v. Momenta
Pharm., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 705, 705 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (No. 3:15-cv-01100).
96. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Certification of
an Interlocutory Appeal at 6, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc., Civil
Action No. 1:16-cv-10112-NMG (D. Mass., filed Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter
Momenta Interlocutory Appeal Brief]. A district court may certify an otherwise nonappealable order (e.g., an order on a motion to dismiss) for interlocutory review by
the relevant appellate court if the order involves “a controlling question of law as to
which there are grounds for a substantial difference of opinion and an immediate
appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”. 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).
97. Memorandum and Order, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc.,
16-10112-NMG (D. Mass., Jun. 1, 2018) [hereinafter Denial of Interlocutory
Appeal].
98. Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 52 at 17.
99. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Announces Settlement in Litigation with
Momenta and Sandoz, GLOBE NEWS WIRE (June 19, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2019/06/19/1871001/0/en/Amphastar-Pharmaceuticals-Inc-AnnouncesSettlement-in-Litigation-with-Momenta-and-Sandoz.html.
[https://perma.cc/3ZDV-WPWW]. Unlike so-called “reverse payment settlements”
in the pharmaceutical sector (see FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013)),
Momenta and Sandoz’s payment to Amphastar was in settlement of Amphastar’s
antitrust claims against them, Amphastar did not agree to withdraw challenges to
Momenta’s patent (as the patent was previously rendered unenforceable by the
court), and Amphastar did not agree to stop selling generic enoxaparin.
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Sandoz agreeing to pay $85 million, to the plaintiffs and their
counsel. 100
10F

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF MOMENTA V. AMPHASTAR—HOW WILL
BIOPHARMA FARE IN THE STANDARDS WARS?
The district court decision in Momenta II was the first to apply
the patent nondisclosure and deception principles established in ICT
standardization cases to parties in the biopharmaceuticals sector.
While there are notable similarities between the facts alleged in
Momenta I and those in earlier ICT cases like Wang, Stambler,
Qualcomm, and the series of cases in involving Rambus, there are
significant differences as well. Momenta raised several of these
differences in its briefing to the Federal Circuit, but because the parties
settled their dispute prior to consideration by the Federal Circuit, the
degree to which these differences might have been persuasive to the
court is unknown. Nevertheless, it is worth considering some of these
distinctions and the degree to which the patent nondisclosure and
deception principles that evolved in the ICT industry are apposite to
standardization at USP and in the biopharma sector more broadly.
A. Is USP an SDO?
Momenta argued in its appellate brief that USP differs
significantly from the computer and telecommunications SDOs
around which the principles of standards deception and nondisclosure
were first developed.
USP is an independent, scientific organization that sets
formulary standards for drugs sold in the United States.
It is not a “standard-setting” body like those previously
addressed by this Court: USP is not a consortium of
industry competitors setting technical requirements
needed for different products to interoperate. Rather,
USP produces monographs describing the attributes of
drugs; the monographs may be incorporated into
requirements set by the FDA. USP’s monographs are
100. Mike Leonard, Momenta, Sandoz Get Preliminary OK for Lovenox Class
Settlement,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
(Jan.
3,
2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/momenta-sandoz-getpreliminary-ok-for-lovenox-class-settlement.
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produced by staff scientists, with input from eminent
scientists who volunteer on advisory panels and others,
including drug companies. 101
In the above description, Momenta points out two principal areas in
which USP is unlike ICT-based SDOs: its organizational structure and
the nature of its standards. Each of these are considered below.
10F

1. SDO Structural Issues
It is true that the technical work of many ICT-based SDOs is
performed largely by volunteer representatives of the SDO’s
membership—usually companies interested in the standards under
development—and the SDO’s staff plays a predominantly
administrative and coordinating role. 102 However, this allocation of
responsibility varies from SDO to SDO, and some SDOs in the ICT
sector have hundreds of professional staff members. 103
Moreover, in Unocal, the FTC brought an enforcement action
against Unocal regarding its failure to disclose relevant patents to the
California Air Resources Board (“CARB”). 104 CARB, a government
agency, developed regulations and standards governing the
composition of low-emissions gasoline. Unocal participated in
CARB’s public rulemaking proceedings, making various proposals
and representations, while at the same time withholding information
about several patent applications that Unocal filed on gasoline
technologies under consideration by CARB. The fact that CARB was
not an industry association typical of the ICT sector did not deter the
FTC from condemning Unocal’s allegedly deceptive conduct. Rather,
the FTC focused on Unocal’s “anticompetitive and exclusionary acts
and practices” that constituted “unfair methods of competition” in
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 105 Unocal’s conduct, the FTC
alleged, caused substantial harm to competition and consumers. 106 The
102F

103F

104F

105F

106F

101. Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 52, at 14; see also id. at 4 (“unlike the
standard-setting organization in Qualcomm, whose members were industry
competitors, USP is an independent, scientific organization.”).
102. See generally, JRC Report, supra note 10, at 91–92.
103. Id.
104. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 2005 WL 6241013 (F.T.C. Jul. 27, 2005).
105. Complaint at 20, In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., F.T.C. Docket No. 9305 (filed
Mar. 4, 2003).
106. Id. at 19.
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organizational structure of CARB, on the other hand, seems to have
had little relevance to the FTC’s analysis of Unocal’s conduct.
The same can be said for those cases involving SDOs in the
ICT sector. In Wang, Stambler, Dell, Qualcomm, and Rambus, the
nature of the SDO had little bearing on the alleged conduct of the
patent holder and was scarcely discussed. Rather, the courts and
agencies considering these cases, whether under equitable defenses to
infringement or affirmative theories of antitrust liability, emphasized
the unilateral conduct of the patent holder in the face of a commitment
to disclose SEPs to the SDO. 107 Accordingly, it does not seem that
structural differences between USP and ICT-based SDOs should play
much, if any, role in analyzing Momenta’s conduct with respect to
non-disclosure of its patents.
107F

2. Nature of the Standards
Momenta also points out that the standards developed by USP
are “monographs describing the attributes of drugs,” rather than
“technical requirements needed for different products to
interoperate.” 108 While this description is itself somewhat inaccurate,
as USP’s Method 207 described a method for testing the purity of a
compound rather than any particular attribute of the compound,
Momenta is correct that USP’s standards differ from ICT-based
standards that seek to enable product interoperability. Yet this
distinction does not seem meaningful in the context of Momenta’s
alleged failure to disclose the ‘886 Patent. If Momenta’s actions
harmed competitors like Amphastar (by inducing them to use an
infringing method when testing the purity of enoxaparin) or hospitals
and healthcare payors (by reducing competition and thus raising the
price of generic enoxaparin), then the fact that the standard related to
a testing method rather than product interoperability is largely
irrelevant. In other words, violating SDO processes for developing
testing standards can be just as harmful to competition as violating
108F

107. Of course, the character of ICT-based SDOs as associations of competitors
is highly relevant in cases charging the SDO or its members with collusion or other
concerted action. See, e.g., George S. Cary & Daniel P. Culley, Concerted Action
in Standard-Setting, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION
LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 61 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
But allegations of collusion at the SDO level played no part in Momenta.
108. Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 52, at 14.
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SDO processes for developing interoperability standards. The FTC’s
reasoning in Unocal supports this conclusion as the relevant CARB
standard related to the chemical composition of reduced emission
gasoline. The standard did not pertain to product interoperability, yet
Unocal’s deceptive concealment of its patents nevertheless resulted in
competitive and consumer harm. Accordingly, the nature of USP’s
standards does not seem particularly relevant to the analysis of
Momenta’s conduct.
B. Was Method 207 Mandatory?
In its appellate briefing, Momenta also emphasized that
Method 207 was not “mandatory” and argued that Amphastar’s
equitable defenses should not apply to a non-mandatory standard. 109
There is clearly some debate regarding whether, as a factual matter,
the FDA mandated Amphastar’s use of Method 207. According to the
district court, “the jury apparently found credible the testimony of
Amphastar’s witnesses…that Amphastar used the revised [AR testing]
procedure in reliance on [Method 207] and was required by the FDA
to do so.” 110 Amphastar emphasized this point in its appellate brief,
arguing that “the FDA required Amphastar to use Method [207] and
following the FDA’s requirements is not optional.” 111
Yet it is not clear from the record that this was actually the
case. As Momenta points out, the USP monograph on enoxaparin
specified the required AR structure to identify the compound but did
not specify a particular testing methodology to detect the AR structure.
The FDA, in an amicus brief that it filed in an earlier phase of this
case, explained that “to satisfy the [FDA] batch-testing requirement, a
manufacturer has considerable latitude to employ any test protocol
that meets the requirements specific to FDA’s approval of that drug,
provided that the accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, and reproducibility
109F

10F

1F

109. Id. at 51–54 (alleging that non-mandatory nature of Method 207 was also a
linchpin of Momenta’s and Sandoz’s request for interlocutory appeal of the District
Court’s denial of their Motion to Dismiss Amphastar’s antitrust suit); Momenta
Interlocutory Appeal Brief, supra note 96.
110. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 258, 270
(D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2018).
111. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 55, Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar
Pharm., Inc., Fed. Cir. Case No. 18–1740 (filed Sept. 21, 2018) [hereinafter
Amphastar Appeal Brief].
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of test methods employed by the firm are established and
documented.” 112
USP’s Method 207 does describe a particular testing process
for detecting the AR structure in manufactured enoxaparin, but this
was not the only known testing process for the AR structure, and the
testing process was not part of the USP enoxaparin monograph. In
fact, Momenta and Sandoz used a different testing process for their
manufactured enoxaparin, and even Amphastar used a process other
than Method 207 in some cases. 113 Momenta argued that while the
FDA required that Amphastar comply with the USP monograph on
enoxaparin, and thus to test for the AR structure, the monograph did
not specify how that testing was to be accomplished. 114
While the FDA was not explicit about the method for testing
generic enoxaparin, there is some ambiguity regarding the degree to
which USP requires the use of Method 207. Method 207 itself states,
“The following procedure is used to determine the levels of [AR
structures] in enoxaparin sodium. [NOTE—The test…is conducted
only where specified in the individual monograph].” 115
This language implies that Method 207 is the way to test for
the AR structure in enoxaparin (as testing is required by the
enoxaparin monograph), not merely a way to test it. Moreover,
Method 207 is included as part of USP’s National Formulary, 116 and
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act explicitly requires that the
strength, quality, and purity of approved drugs be tested “in
accordance with the tests or methods of assay set forth in [the relevant]
compendium” (in this case, the USP National Formulary). 117 There is
thus a reasonable case to be made that the use of Method 207 was
mandatory, at least to some degree.
But even if the use of Method 207 was not mandatory, it is not
clear that this relieves Momenta of liability under relevant doctrines
pertaining to patent disclosure in standard-setting. Admittedly, some
technical standards that have been subject to disputes regarding patent
12F

13F

14F

15F

16F

17F

112. Corrected Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Momenta
Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., (Filed Jul. 17. 2015) (quoting 21 C.F.R. §
211.165(e)).
113. Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 52, at 53–54.
114. Id. at 53–54.
115. Method 207, supra note 50, at 1.
116. Id.
117. 21 U.S.C. § 351(b), § 321(j).
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disclosure are mandated by government edict. One example is the
standard for low emissions gasoline adopted by CARB, which was at
issue in Unocal. However, in the ICT sector, most technical standards
are voluntary. That is, firms are not required, either by government
regulation or SDO rules, to use them. 118 The success or failure of
interoperability standards is thus dictated largely by market forces
rather than government edict, and the landscape is littered with
abandoned standards that never achieved market success (e.g., who
remembers WIMAX, Firewire, or HD-DVD?). In fact, the voluntary
nature of collaboratively developed standards (at least before the
market broadly adopts them) is one of the principal safety mechanisms
that ensures that SDOs do not exert anticompetitive market power by
forcing participants to adopt their standards. 119
Nevertheless, Momenta attempts to recharacterize the
voluntary nature of most ICT standards, reasoning that they are
“effectively mandatory”—an industry participant must practice them
in order to compete effectively. 120 Momenta argues that the threat of
patent hold-up and the accompanying anticompetitive effects occur
only when the adoption of a standard is mandatory (or “effectively”
mandatory). But because Method 207 was not mandatory, Momenta
argues it could not hold the industry “hostage” as Qualcomm and
others allegedly did in the ICT standards deception cases. Momenta
argues that failing to disclose patents covering optional standards
“creates no trap because industry participants can choose alternate
technology.” 121
Momenta’s arguments here are worth considering in some
detail, as they address the fundamental rationale behind liability for
standards deception. Clearly, when a technology is not standardized,
a patent holder is free (subject to generally-applicable antitrust laws)
to assert its patents covering that technology in any manner, whether
to extract whatever royalties the market will bear or to prevent others
18F

19F

120F

12F

118. See David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1913, 1919–20 (2003); ABA COMM. ON TECH. STANDARDIZATION,
STANDARDIZATION DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL IX, (Jorge L. Contreras
ed., 2007) [hereinafter ABA Standards Manual].
119. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Technical Standards Setting Organizations &
Competition: A Case for Deference to Markets, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION
CRITICAL LEGAL ISSUES WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 155 at 9–10 (2008).
120. Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 52, at 52.
121. Id. at 52–53.
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from competing with respect to patented features. If a product
manufacturer does not wish to pay the required royalty, or fears an
injunction from the patent holder, then the manufacturer is free to use
an alternate, non-infringing technology.
When the patented technology is standardized, however,
different considerations come into play. A standard is intended to be
broadly adopted, and an SDO imposes a patent disclosure policy to
promote the broad adoption of its standards. Market participants are
encouraged to adopt such standards with the expectation that all SEPs
have been disclosed. On that basis, they can make investments in
manufacturing, design, marketing, and the like based on the
standardized technology, whether or not it is formally mandated by
law or SDO rules. When a patent holder emerges later with a
previously undisclosed SEP, these investments can be upset.
In the case of enoxaparin, it appears that several methods of
conducting AR structure testing were available, and several noninfringing alternatives were in use by Momenta, Sandoz, and
Amphastar. If Amphastar truly had no obligation to use Method 207,
then the only harm suffered by Amphastar from Momenta’s late
disclosure of the ‘886 patent would have been its cost of switching to
an alternate, non-infringing testing method. Nevertheless, those
switching costs may have been non-negligible. In addition, in October
2011 Momenta obtained a preliminary injunction preventing
Amphastar from selling generic enoxaparin on the basis of the ‘886
patent. 122 Though the Federal Circuit stayed the injunction four
months later, Amphastar’s sales of generic enoxaparin remained
limited due to the ongoing litigation. 123 The class action plaintiffs in
Tennessee claimed that Momenta and Sandoz reaped hundreds of
millions of dollars in wrongful overcharges as a result of Momenta’s
concealment of its patent. 124 These considerations all point to some
monetary remedy that might have been available to Momenta and the
class action plaintiffs, which might have been borne out by the multimillion dollar settlements that Momenta reached with each of them.
12F

123F

124F

122. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 258, 262
(D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2018).
123. Amended Complaint at 19–21, Amphastar Pharm., Inc. et. al. v. Momenta
Pharm., Inc., No. 5:15-cv-01914 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Amended Complaint].
124. Id. at 2.
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However, the district court’s ruling in Momenta II did not
award monetary relief to Amphastar. Rather, the district court
rendered Momenta’s ‘886 patent unenforceable against the practice of
Method 207 (i.e., Momenta’s waiver of its right to enforce the patent
and its estoppel from doing so). And, presumably, this ruling would
extend not only to Amphastar, but also to other producers of generic
enoxaparin (e.g., Teva), and most likely stands even after the parties’
settlement of their various suits. As such, the unenforceability remedy
can be seen as even more potent than monetary relief.125 And it is
distinctly unrelated to the harm suffered by implementers of the
relevant standard. Rather, it addresses deceptive conduct by the patent
holder in violating the SDO’s policies and is imposed to safeguard the
integrity of the SDO standardization process, whether or not particular
harm can be shown in a given instance. That is, even if Amphastar and
the class action plaintiffs were unable to prove any monetary injury
arising from Momenta’s concealment of the ‘886 patent, the
unenforceability remedy would still be available to punish Momenta
for its deceptive conduct. The next sections explore the contours of
this liability.
125F

C. Intent to Trap the Industry
Momenta argues that even if it was required to disclose the
‘886 patent to USP and failed to do so, the district court should not
have imposed the remedy of patent unenforceability because Momenta
did not intend to “trap” the industry into using a standard that it had
patented. 126 On the contrary, Momenta actively opposed the adoption
of Method 207 at USP. Momenta argues that it “sought to prevent USP
from locking Momenta and anyone else into using Method 207 so that
industry would be free to use newer, more accurate methods.” 127
Momenta contrasts its behavior with that of Qualcomm in Qualcomm
I, observing that “Qualcomm had engaged in a carefully orchestrated
plan with the deadly determination of holding hostage the entire
126F

127F

125. See Jorge L. Contreras, Equity, Antitrust, and the Reemergence of the Patent
Unenforceability Remedy, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Nov. 1, 2011, at 5–7 (discussing
remedy of patent unenforceability and other equitable remedies).
126. Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 48, at 55–56.
127. Id. at 56 (possibly contradicting Momenta’s prior argument that Method 207
was not mandatory).
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industry desiring to practice the…standard.” 128 Momenta’s behavior,
on the other hand, was “the very opposite of a patent holder
intentionally trapping an industry into using its patent.” 129
Momenta’s arguments are worth considering here. In most
standards deception cases, the patent holder allegedly urged the SDO
to adopt the standard—portions of which it had surreptitiously
patented. If Momenta’s assertions are taken at face value, then its
opposition to Method 207 would indeed suggest a less abusive pattern
of conduct than that challenged in cases like Qualcomm I. 130
Nevertheless, Method 207 was ultimately adopted by USP as
a standard, and Momenta did fail to disclose the ‘886 patent. If there
were no penalty for such omissions, the effectiveness of SDO rules
requiring disclosure would be severely limited.
This is perhaps the reason that the FTC, in its case against Dell
Computer, adopted what could be termed a strict liability standard for
failure to disclose SEPs to an SDO. 131 In her dissenting statement,
Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga outlines the relative blamelessness
of Dell in dealing with the Video Electronics Standards Association
(“VESA”):
Nothing in the limited information available to the
Commission suggests that Dell had any greater role in
the development and promulgation of the VESA VLbus standard than that described in the minimal factual
allegations in the complaint. For example, the
complaint does not allege that Dell proposed or
sponsored the standard, that Dell urged others to vote
for the standard, that Dell employees participated in
drafting the standard, that Dell employees were
present, in person or online, during the committee
drafting sessions, that Dell steered the VESA
committee toward adopting a standard that
128F

129F

130F

13F

128. Id. at 50 (quoting Qualcomm Corp. v. Broadcom Inc., 548 F.3d 1004, 1009–
10 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
129. Id. at 56.
130. Even Qualcomm disputed the characterization of its behavior, arguing that
“[e]ven if a duty to disclose had been breached, this breach is best explained as
negligence, oversight, or thoughtlessness, which does not create a waiver.”
Qualcomm Corp. v. Broadcom Inc., 548 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008).
131. See Dell Computer Corp., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mary L.
Azcuenaga, 121 F.T.C. 627, 630 (1996).
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incorporated Dell technology, or that Dell had any
hand whatsoever in shaping the standard. The sole act
for which Dell is charged with a violation of law is that
Dell’s voting representative, in voting to adopt the
standard, signed a certification that to the best of his
knowledge, the proposed standard did not infringe on
any relevant intellectual property. 132
Nevertheless, the FTC held that because Dell, as an entity, must have
been aware of its patent covering the VL-Bus standard and because it
did not disclose that patent to VESA, Dell lost the ability to enforce
that patent against others. “[W]here Dell failed to act in good faith to
identify and disclose patent conflicts—enforcement action is
appropriate to prevent harm to competition and consumers.” 133
Momenta, for its part, appears to have had an even greater
awareness of its relevant SEP than the Dell engineer who certified that
he was unaware of Dell’s pending patents covering the VL-bus
standard. At least Dr. Shriver, who made representations to USP, was
listed as an inventor on the ‘886 patent and could hardly claim to have
been unaware of it. Accordingly, the district court’s holding that the
‘886 patent was unenforceable does not go even so far as the FTC did
in Dell.
Likewise, there is little basis for Momenta’s argument that
only intentional scheming to trap the industry is required to warrant a
remedy of patent unenforceability. Without this remedy, the incentives
to comply with SDO disclosure policies would be significantly
weakened.
132F

13F

D. Reliance
The district court in Momenta II also adopted the jury’s
advisory verdict finding that Momenta should be equitably estopped
from enforcing the ‘886 patent against Amphastar. 134 In analyzing this
claim, the court first recited the three general elements required for
equitable estoppel: 1) misleading conduct resulting in a reasonable
134F

132. Id. at 628.
133. Dell Comput. Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 624 (1996). The FTC declined to
address the prospect of liability for truly “inadvertent” failures to disclose patent
rights; Id. at 625.
134. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 258, 270
(D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2018).
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inference of non-enforcement, 2) reliance, and 3) material prejudice
resulting from the patent owner’s assertion. 135 The findings, discussed
above—that Momenta failed to disclose the ‘886 patent as required by
USP’s rules—support a finding of misleading conduct by Momenta.
Likewise, material prejudice is not difficult to find based on
Amphastar’s alleged investment in the conduct of Method 207. 136
Proving reliance, however, was “a closer question that was
vigorously disputed at trial.” 137 Ultimately, the district court deferred
to the jury’s evaluation of witness credibility in making this
determination. 138 In its appellate brief, Momenta refuted Amphastar’s
reliance arguments on several grounds. First, Momenta noted that
Amphastar could not have relied on any statement or action of
Momenta, because the parties had no dealings until this litigation. 139
Second, Momenta objected to the district court’s “substituting
Amphastar’s supposed reliance on USP in place of any reliance on
statements or conduct by Momenta.” 140 Even if such reliance could
estop Momenta from asserting its patent, Momenta argued that
Amphastar had no relationship or communication with USP either.
Finally, Momenta points out that Amphastar did not start using
Method 207 until 2011 after Momenta sued Amphastar for patent
infringement. Accordingly, Amphastar could not have relied on
Momenta’s alleged deception in deciding to use Method 207. 141
Clearly, the facts in this case are complex, and the district court
might have been justified in leaving such a fraught factual
determination to the jury. Yet the difficulty of proving reliance in
equitable estoppel cases has raised doubts regarding the general
effectiveness of this doctrine in the standards-setting context. 142 To
135F

136F

137F

138F

139F

140F

14F

142F

135. Id. at 269 (citing Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor, 709 F.3d 1124, 1130 (Fed. Cir.
2013)).
136. Id. at 270.
137. Id. at 269.
138. Id. at 270.
139. Momenta Appeal Brief, supra note 52, at 69.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 69–71.
142. See Contreras, supra note 8, at 522–23 (“equitable estoppel is not an ideal
theoretical framework for the general enforcement of [standards-related patent
commitments]”); George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 939 (2011)
(both the reliance and material prejudice elements of equitable estoppel may be
difficult to prove in the standards context); Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn,
An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39 (2009)
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address the potential mismatch between equitable estoppel and the
misfeasance that can arise from deception in the standardsdevelopment context, the Author has previously proposed that courts
consider a modified form of promissory estoppel in which the
implementer of a standardized product need not prove actual reliance
on any statement or action of the defaulting patent holder, but that the
implementer need only to prove that the patent holder participated in
an industry-wide standardization activity intended to produce a
broadly adopted standard (“market reliance”). 143 This approach would
alleviate many of the evidentiary challenges presented by cases such
as Momenta.
143F

E. Antitrust Claims
While Amphastar’s antitrust claims against Momenta and
Sandoz survived the defendants’ motion to dismiss, those claims were
never fully adjudicated, either in the antitrust suit brought by
Amphastar or the class action filed in Tennessee. 144 In denying
Momenta’s motion to dismiss and its request for certification of an
interlocutory appeal, the court noted primarily that Amphastar stated
legally-cognizable claims, the disposition of which would require the
introduction of factual evidence and the application of the law to those
facts. 145 Yet the cases were settled prior to the adjudication of factual
questions.
That being said, it is worth considering the two antitrust issues
as to which Momenta requested certification. First, building on its
earlier argument that Method 207 was not mandatory, 146 Momenta
claims that USP’s adoption of Method 207 was merely a
“certification” of Method 207 and that mere “product certification”
14F

145F

146F

(“equitable estoppel has inherent limitations that preclude its effectiveness against
snake-in-the-grass and bait-and-switch tactics. The primary defects are its
requirements of: (1) misrepresentation by the patentee to the infringer; (2)
reasonable reliance on those promises by the infringer; and (3) material reliance”).
But see Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for
Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1086 (2013)
(describing equitable estoppel as a viable “anti-opportunism safety valve” for
standard setting).
143. Contreras, supra note 8, at 542–43.
144. See Section II.H, supra (discussing settlement of antitrust cases).
145. Momenta Interlocutory Appeal Brief, supra note 96, at 369.
146. See supra Section III.B (Momenta’s argument that Method 207 was not
mandatory).
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lacks the exclusionary effect necessary for an antitrust violation. 147
That is, while USP’s endorsement of Method 207 demonstrates that it
was an acceptable method for testing enoxaparin, alternative testing
methods exist, including alternative methods used by Amphastar
itself. Thus, even if Momenta’s failure to disclose its patent covering
Method 207 violated USP’s rules and procedures, 148 this conduct
should not give rise to antitrust liability unless it resulted in the
exclusion of other competing methods. And because Momenta’s
failure to disclose clearly did not result in such exclusion, no antitrust
liability should attach to that failure. Accordingly, Momenta asked the
court to certify to the First Circuit the question “whether antitrust
liability requires that the alleged misconduct cause the standardsetting organization to eliminate alternative technologies.” 149
Momenta’s second proposed question for interlocutory appeal
was “whether antitrust plaintiffs must allege that the standard-setting
organization would not have adopted the patented technology but for
the defendant’s misrepresentation.” 150 This question has roots in the
DC Circuit’s rejection of antitrust claims against Rambus, Inc. 151 In
Rambus v. FTC, the court found that while Rambus may have engaged
in unethical behavior, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the relevant
SDO would not have adopted Rambus’s technology but for its failure
to disclose its patents as required by the SDO’s rules. 152
Both of these proposed questions are based on the premise that
even if Momenta breached USP’s rules by failing to disclose the ‘886
patent, that breach should not constitute a violation of the antitrust
laws because “antitrust remedies are rarely appropriate to regulate
standard-setting conduct.” 153 Momenta’s bid to limit the reach of the
antitrust laws in the context of standard-setting reflects a larger debate
in the standardization world. Among other authorities, Momenta
quotes two separate speeches by Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney
147F

148F

149F

150F

15F

152F

153F

147. Momenta Interlocutory Appeal Brief, supra note 96, at 369.
148. In this regard, Momenta cites various authorities for the proposition that
deceptive conduct, and even “acts of pure malice” do not necessarily give rise to
antitrust violations. See Momenta Interlocutory Appeal Brief, supra note 96, at 370
(quoting Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464).
149. Momenta Interlocutory Appeal Brief, supra note 96, at 369 (emphasis
added).
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
152. Id. at 466–67.
153. Momenta Interlocutory Appeal Brief, supra note 96, at 6.

2021]

IS BIOPHARMA READY FOR THE STANDARD

77

General for the DOJ Antitrust Division, in each of which Mr.
Delrahim argues that antitrust remedies should be disfavored in the
context of technical standard setting.154 Along these lines, the DOJ and
like-minded commentators have increasingly argued that single-firm
conduct (monopolization) should attract less antitrust scrutiny than
collusive behavior by the members of standards bodies. 155 This shift
in emphasis would tend to exonerate allegedly deceptive behavior by
firms like Rambus, Qualcomm, and Momenta and instead place
greater pressure on measures taken by SDOs to limit the leverage of
patent-asserting firms. 156 And though these issues never reached full
adjudication in Momenta, their appearance indicates that the issues at
stake in this dispute among generic biopharmaceutical manufacturers
are not fundamentally different than those currently litigated in the
ICT sector.
154F

15F

156F

F. The Need for Clarity in Biopharma SDO Policies
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the Momenta cases is the
uncertain foundation upon which the obligation to disclose patents at
USP was built. The district court acknowledged that USP’s Guidelines
(which applied only to Sponsors) did not create a disclosure
obligation, and that Momenta’s employee, Dr. Shriver, technically
complied with the conflict of interest rules set out in USP’s Rules and
Procedures. 157 The only source of a disclosure obligation binding on
Momenta arose from the conflict of interest form that Dr. Shriver
submitted, which asked him to list “other professional or financial
157F

154. See id. at 6 and 9-10 (quoting Makan Delrahim, Good Times, Bad Times,
Trust Will Take Us Far: Competition Enforcement and the Relationship Between
Washington and Brussels, Remarks as Prepared for the College of Europe, at 8 (Feb.
21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1036541/download and Makan
Delrahim, Take It to the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application
of Antitrust Law, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at USC Gould School of Law,
at 9 (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download).
155. See Jorge L. Contreras, Taking it to the Limit: Shifting U.S. Antitrust Policy
Toward Standards Development, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 66 (Fall 2018)
(describing shift in U.S. DOJ policy toward standard setting).
156. See id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Justice Department’s New Position on
Patents, Standard Setting, and Injunctions, THE REGULATORY REVIEW, (Jan. 6,
2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/01/06/hovenkamp-justice-departmentnew-position-patents-standard-setting-injunctions/ [https://perma.cc/VHL9UTQH]; Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND
Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L. J. 2110 (2018).
157. See supra Section II.C.

78

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 7

interests.” 158 His failure to list the ‘886 patent in response to this
question gave rise to the “ambiguity” identified by the court and to the
subsequent introduction of evidence of the common understanding of
participants regarding patent disclosure.
The district court in Momenta II followed the lead of the
Federal Circuit in Rambus v. Infineon and Qualcomm I by looking to
such common understandings when confronted with ambiguous SDO
policy language. In particular, the court focused on USP’s insistence
that Sanofi-Aventis abandon its own patent covering purity testing for
enoxaparin. 159 That, together with other witness testimony, gave rise
to the obligation that the court found for all other expert panel
members to disclose patents held by their own companies.
Such a disclosure expectation and obligation may, indeed,
have existed at USP. However, it was far from clear. A written policy
document that clearly described what patent disclosure obligations, if
any, bound the members of USP expert panels would have been
preferable. The FTC’s 1996 ruling against Dell and the Federal
Circuit’s 2003 holding in Rambus v. Infineon served as wake-up calls
to SDOs in the ICT sector. In particular, the Federal Circuit’s sharp
critique of the JEDEC patent policy—which the court characterized as
suffering from “a staggering lack of defining details” that left SDO
participants with only “vaguely defined expectations as to what they
believe the policy requires” 160—motivated many SDOs to clarify their
own policies in this regard. 161 The result is that many SDOs in the ICT
sector increased their patent policies in length and complexity and
defined the obligations of SDO participants with a reasonable degree
of specificity.
Unfortunately, with a few exceptions, the same degree of
evolution has not occurred in the policies of SDOs that operate in the
biopharma sector. 162 USP’s Rules and Procedures, as they are
158F

159F

160F

16F

162F

158. Shriver, supra note 73.
159. Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 258, 267
(D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2018).
160. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
161. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 6, at 27. Shortly after the Infineon decision
was released, the American Bar Association initiated a three-year long project to
provide drafting guidance to the industry regarding the terms of SDO patent policies.
ABA Standards Manual, supra note 118.
162. Notable exceptions include Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE),
which has adopted a robust intellectual property policy addressing trademarks,
copyrights and patents, Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) International,
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described in Momenta, resemble the conflict of interest policies of
scientific journals and funding agencies more than patent policies of
technical standards bodies. 163 To avoid the degree of uncertainty and
the resulting disputes that arose in the Momenta cases, USP and other
SDOs in the biopharma sector should carefully review their existing
patent policies and make any necessary clarifications and amendments
to ensure that these policies clearly and unambiguously define the
obligations of their participants. 164 This exercise can produce added
clarity that will facilitate the standardization process, avoid
unintentional breaches of policy, and, hopefully, thwart those who
deliberately wish to abuse the standardization process to their own
ends.
163F

164F

V. CONCLUSION
Momenta v. Amphastar demonstrates that issues surrounding
the acquisition and disclosure of patents claiming standardized
technologies have more salience in the biopharma sector than
commonly believed. While significant factual uncertainty continues to
exist regarding the intentions and obligations of the parties in
Momenta, the lack of clarity inherent in USP’s policies echoes the
ambiguities that plagued SDO policies in the ICT sector two decades
ago. As such, standards organizations operating in the biopharma
sector should ensure that their policies and procedures are robust
enough to delineate clearly the obligations of participants with respect
to patents covering standardized technologies. Organizations that
participate in biopharma standards-development should heed the
Inc., Principles of Governance – Appendix A: Intellectual Property Agreement
(March 14, 2019), and the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH), a
group that develops standards for genomic data exchange and storage, which is in
the process of developing such policies. Global Alliance for Genomics & Health,
Constitution of the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health, § 7 (v2, Jan. 22, 2018).
Most, however, have not. See Contreras & Thorogood, supra note 4.
163. See Contreras & Rinehart, supra note 70.
164. In 2008 the author foresaw that SDO intellectual property policy issues could
affect the biopharmaceutical industry. See Jorge L. Contreras, Correspondence:
Legal Issues in the Development of Biological Research Standards, 26 NATURE
BIOTECH. 498, 499 (2008):
To date, the biological sciences have been blissfully free of the standards litigation
battles that have plagued the ICT industry. With the increasing adoption of standards
by biological researchers, however, these issues will become increasingly relevant.
Thus, participants in the biological research field should take care to organize their
standards-development efforts carefully and with adequate legal consideration.
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valuable lessons offered by more than three decades of litigation in the
technology sector.

